After much consideration regarding what cognition does at the most elemental level, I am left with the view that cognition is an adapted mechanism which fundamentally differentiates.
Differentiation, however, cannot be done without categorization; of what use would the former be if precluded from the latter?
When an object is distinguished from another, the brain positions them into different "categorical boxes," by default. And assuming this is the case, then roughly, cognition must be said to differentiate and categorize simultaneously. Then, perhaps the two words were categorized wrongly and differentiated unnecessarily.
But there is another wrongly distinguished component here: differentiation and categorization cannot be done without ascribing values to each object perceived, such that they may be distinguished to begin with—otherwise, they couldn’t yet be recognized as separate objects in my estimation, nor could they be placed into different categories by our mind.
This leads me to believe that in “one” elemental feature of cognition, we in fact have three synonymous cohabitants to consider; differentiation, categorization, and valuation. More or less, I believe these to be the same thing, or at least; each relies upon the other and cannot usefully be managed without all operating simultaneously.
Aggregated, we’re left with a broader concept to consider: the sum of differentiation, categorization, and valuation leaves you with something like, the production of a hierarchy—i.e., each object that the mind perceives must be distinguished by some valuated judgement to first separate perceived objects, and then categorize them to begin with. This is necessarily the production of a hierarchy. And the hierarchy that is produced, may be ordered along multiple dimensions.
So, when I say “hierarchy” I am only recognizing the differentiated values that must be placed on all perceived objects for them to be recognized as distinct (or recognized at all). I am not, however, supposing that what is produced is some clean, linear hierarchy, but a dynamic hierarchy that is constantly shifting its focus based on the body’s relative positioning in different environments and with differing needs. This is a hierarchy nonetheless—and one that’s manufactured due to the differential values ascribed to all perceived objects, and due to the categorical structure that perception entails.
I have long thought this to be true regarding how the mind works at its most elemental level, i.e., that the four processes described, effectively describe only one. (I feel obliged to add: Hegel deserves some degree of credit for this belief of mine).1
Okay, very well then. There are a few implications to be considered if this is true; for one, and for whatever their merits, it cannot bode well for the more liberal-minded among us if the core of human cognition is found resting upon segregation, differential judgement, and hierarchy.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Michael Inwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 43–71, §§90–165


